This article analyzes the Brazilian political system from the local perspective. Following Cox (1997), we review the problems with electoral coordination that emerge from a given institutional framework. Due to the characteristics of the Brazilian Federal system and its electoral rules, linkage between the three levels of government is not guaranteed a priori, but demands a coordinating effort by the parties' leadership. According to our hypothesis, the parties are capable of coordinating their election strategies at different levels in the party system. Regression models based on two-stage least squares (2SLS) and TOBIT, analyzing a panel of Brazilian municipalities with data from the 1994 and 2000 elections, show that the proportion of votes received by a party in a given election correlates closely with its previous votes in majoritarian elections. Despite institutional incentives, the Brazilian party system shows evidence that it is organized nationally to the extent that it links the competition for votes at the three levels of government (National, State, and Municipal).

Dans cet article, on examine le système politique du point de vue local. Selon l'exemple de Cox (1997), on considère les problèmes de coordination électorale qui surgissent à partir d'un cadre institutionnel donné. Compte tenu des caractéristiques de la fédération brésilienne et de ses règles électorales, l'articulation entre les trois sphères du gouvernement n'est pas assurée et demande un effort de coordination de la part des leaders des partis. On part de l'hypothèse que les partis sont capables de coordonner leurs stratégies électorales à divers niveaux du système. Les estimations des modèles de régression à deux stades (2SLS) et par TOBIT, prenant pour base un panel de municipalités brésiliennes comprenant les données des élections de 1994 et 2000, montrent que la proportion des votes reçus par un parti lors d'une élection est étroitement liée aux votes reçus précédemment aux élections majoritaires. Malgré les aides institutionnelles, le système brésilien de partis semble organisé nationalement dans la mesure où il articule la compétition électorale aux trois niveaux de gouvernement.

Este trabalho discute os movimentos contraditórios no sentido da descentralização e da centralização examinando dois conjuntos de políticas: as que trataram de regular as relações fiscais entre os governos nacional e subnacionais e aquelas que redefiniram as responsabilidades no tocante à provisão de alguns serviços sociais. Sustenta-se aqui que, do ponto de vista das relações intergovernamentais, a federação brasileira é um arranjo complexo em que convivem tendências centralizadoras e descentralizadoras, impulsionadas por diferentes forças, com motivações diversas, produzindo resultados variados.

This paper discusses the contradictory impulses towards decentralization and centralization in Brazil during the 1990s and early 2000s. After discussing the analytical issues related to the specific nature of decentralization in federal systems, the paper examines two sets of policy issues: those regulating the fiscal relations between national and sub-national governments and those redefining responsibilities for social services provision (basic education, health care, social assistance). Against conventional academic wisdom, it sustains that although there has been some re-centralization of fiscal decisions and of targeted income transfer programs, a clear re-centralization tendency cannot be siad to exist. Decentralization and centralization trends coexist propelled by different forces, with different motives and different outcomes.

Ce travail discute des mouvements contradictoires concernant la décentralisation et la centralisation et examine deux ensembles de politiques: celles qui ont tâché de réglementer les relations fiscales entre les gouvernements national et sousnationaux et celles qui ont redéfini les responsabilités en ce qui concerne la provision de certains services sociaux. On prône ici que, du point de vue des relations entre les gouvernements, la fédération brésilienne est un arrangement complexe où cohabitent des tendances centralisatrices et décentralisatrices, poussées par différents forces, aux motivations diverses et qui produisent des résultats variés.

Este trabalho discute os movimentos contraditórios no sentido da descentralização e da centralização examinando dois conjuntos de políticas: as que trataram de regular as relações fiscais entre os governos nacional e subnacionais e aquelas que redefiniram as responsabilidades no tocante à provisão de alguns serviços sociais. Sustenta-se aqui que, do ponto de vista das relações intergovernamentais, a federação brasileira é um arranjo complexo em que convivem tendências centralizadoras e descentralizadoras, impulsionadas por diferentes forças, com motivações diversas, produzindo resultados variados.

This paper discusses contradictory movements in centralization and de-centralization by examining two groups of policies: those that are meant to regulate fiscal relations between national and subnational governments and those that have redefined responsibilities relating to the provision of certain social services. It is maintained here that, from the point of view of inter-governmental relations, the Brazilian federation is a complex arrangement within which centralizing and de-centralizing tendencies co-exist, impelled by different forces, responding to different motivations and producing a variety of results.

Ce travail discute des mouvements contradictoires concernant la décentralisation et la centralisation et examine deux ensembles de politiques: celles qui ont tâché de réglementer les relations fiscales entre les gouvernements national et sousnationaux et celles qui ont redéfini les responsabilités en ce qui concerne la provision de certains services sociaux. On prône ici que, du point de vue des relations entre les gouvernements, la fédération brésilienne est un arrangement complexe où cohabitent des tendances centralisatrices et décentralisatrices, poussées par différents forces, aux motivations diverses et qui produisent des résultats variés.

O artigo enfoca as iniciativas do governo Lula na área social. Inicialmente descreve-se o processo de reforma social implementado ao longo dos governos que se sucederam à redemocratização do país. Em seguida são examinados alguns indicadores da evolução das condições sociais relacionados às políticas na área social no período democrático. Por fim, analisam-se as visões predominantes no governo petista sobre a questão social e as políticas mais apropriadas para enfrentá-la, discutindo as suas propostas e iniciativas na área social.

The article focuses on the initiatives taken by the Lula administration regarding social policies. To begin with, we describe the social reform process implemented by the governments that followed the redemocratization of Brazil. Then, we examine some indices showing the evolution of social conditions due to social policies practiced during the democratic period. Finally, we analyze the views about the social question predominant in the PT government, as well as the most appropriate policies to tackle such a question. We also discuss the present government's proposals and initiatives regarding the social area.

Este artigo aborda a questão democrática enfocando a dinâmica da política local no Brasil. À luz das evidências políticas que embasaram o importante papel do município como alicerce da democracia, estabelecida pelo modelo federativo resultante da Constituição de 1988, como a dinâmica de transferência de recursos e o desenho das políticas sociais, o trabalho analisa de forma geral o mapa de valores e opiniões de elites e lideranças locais com relação a atribuições e competências de diferentes níveis de governo. Os dados analisados provêm da pesquisa Democracia e governo local, realizada com 450 lideranças de municípios brasileiros.

This article analyses the democratic question in Brazil, focusing on the dinamycs of the local politics. Based on the evidences that show the main role of the municipality in the democraic process, as it was established in the federative model of the 1988 Constitution, for instance, the model of resources distribution and the model of social policies, this work analyses in a general way the map of values and opinions of the local elites and leaderships in what refers to the competences of different levels of government. The data were produced in the research Democracy and local government, with 450 interviews conducted with Brazilian local leaderships.

RESUMO O artigo discute a política das políticas de privatização das telecomunicações no Brasil. Argumenta que suas características resultam de um processo de reforma completamente negociado, explicado pelo cenário institucional que define uma estrutura específica de pontos de veto e pelas concepções predominantes, entre membros da coalizão governante, sobre o papel econômico adequado do Estado. Na primeira parte, são rapidamente apresentadas as condições do setor de telecomunicações anteriores à privatização, a política de privatização e seus resultados. Na segunda parte, são resumidas as ideias sobre o papel econômico do Estado subjacente ao debate sobre a privatização de empresas estatais. Na terceira parte, discute o processo político pelo qual a privatização das telecomunicações se concretizou, enfatizando o papel das instituições e dos atores relevantes

ABSTRACT The article discusses the politics of telecommunications’ privatization policies in Brazil. It argues that its features result from a thoroughly negotiated reform process, explained either by the institutional setting defining a particular veto points structure and by the predominant conceptions, among members of governing coalition, about the proper economic role of the State. In the first part, telecommunications sector’s conditions previous to privatization, the privatization policy and its results are rapidly presented. In the second part, the ideas about the economic role of the state underlying the debate about privatization of State-owned enterprises are summarized. In the third part, it discusses the political process through which the privatization of telecommunications came true, stressing the role of institutions and relevant actors.

Brazil’s experience in the privatization of public companies belies explanations to the effect that the success of market-oriented economic reforms depends on the existence of an Executive branch endowed with the autonomy to conceive and impose strategies of change opposed by vested interests. The article contends that privatization has moved forward in Brazil despite the clear absence of an autonomous Executive, through a negotiated process of change that is part of an institutional context which multiplies both points of veto and actors holding veto power. As a consequence, success depends upon the interplay of pro- and anti-privatization interests, within institutional constraints, as well as upon relevant actors’ dominant ideas concerning the public sector’s role and scope.

Selon cet article, l’expérience brésilienne de privatisation des entreprises publiques va à l’encontre des arguments qui considèrent l’existence d’un pouvoir exécutif suffisamment autonome pour imposer des stratégies de changement contraires aux intérêts établis comme condition indispensable au succès des réformes économiques qui visent le marché. L’auteur affirme que, malgré la nette absence d’un pouvoir exécutif autonome, la privatisation avance et constitue un processus de changements négocié, inséré dans un contexte institutionnel qui multiplie les points de veto et les acteurs avec droit de veto. Ainsi, son succès dépend, dans le cadre des institutions, du jeu des intérêts favorables ou contraires à la privatisation, ainsi que de la pensée dominante des principaux acteurs à propos du rôle et de l’importance du secteur public.